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Abstract
Secure chips, e.g. present in smart cards, TPM, USB dongles are now ubiquitous in applications with
strong security requirements. Secure chips host personal data that must be carefully managed and
protected, thus requiring embedded data management techniques. However, secure chips have severe
hardware constraints which make traditional database techniques irrelevant. We previously addressed
the problem of scaling down database techniques for the smart card and proposed the design of a DBMS
kernel called PicoDBMS. This paper summarizes the learning obtained during an extensive performance
analysis of PicoDBMS. Then it studies to which extent secure chips hardware evolution should impact
the design of embedded data management techniques. Finally, it draws research perspectives linked to
a broader usage of secure chip data management techniques.
1 Introduction
Secure chips, i.e. chips with a high level of tamper resistance, are now ubiquitous in applications with strong
security requirements. Secure chips are integrated in smart cards, Trusted Platform Modules (TPM [15]) and
other forms of radio-frequency or pluggable smart tokens like USB dongles [7] or Mass Memory Cards [13].
Smart card is the most popular secure chip form factor and is used worldwide in applications such as banking,
pay-TV, GSM subscriber identification, loyalty, healthcare and transportation. Now, large-scale governmental
projects are pushing for an ever wider acceptance of smart cards (passport, driving license, e-voting, insurance
or transport). Secure chips are also at the heart of computing systems, to protect PC platforms against piracy
[15] or to enforce Digital Right Management in rendering devices [14]. Finally, chips are today integrated in
a large diversity of usual objects to form an ambient intelligence surrounding. While security seems not the
primary concern in this latter case, the strong demand of individual for enforcing their elementary rights to
privacy quickly changes the situation.
In all these scenarios, data hosted by the secure chips is personal and must be carefully managed and pro-
tected. Embedded data management techniques are thus required to store the data securely (thanks to the chip
tamper resistance) and act as a trusted doorkeeper, which authenticates each user (i.e., human being or software)
and solely delivers her authorized view of the data. While a full fledged on board DBMS is not always required
in all scenarios, access control policies may entail on-board computation of select, join and aggregate operators.
Secure chips have however strong hardware constraints, and more importantly a very unique resource balance
(e.g., powerful CPU vs. tiny RAM, very fast read vs. very low write in stable storage, etc) which make current
database techniques, even those designed for lightweight DBMS [11] irrelevant.
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In a previous paper, we addressed the problem of scaling down database techniques for the smart card
and proposed the design of a DBMS kernel called PicoDBMS [12]. We recently conduct extensive performance
measurements of PicoDBMS on a Gemalto’s smart card experimental platform and on a hardware cycle-accurate
simulator allowing conducting tests on databases exceeding the smart card storage capacity. The objective was
to assess PicoDBMS overall performance as well as the relative performance of candidate storage and indexing
data structures.
The first contribution of this paper is to expose the learning obtained during this long and tricky experimen-
tation process thus answering the question “an the PicoDBMS design effectively accommodate real hardware
platforms?”. Since the initial PicoDBMS design, secure chip hardware evolved following roughly Moore’s law.
A second question is then “Is scaling down database techniques for secure chips still a topical issue today?”.
The second contribution of this paper is to study the hardware progress and show how it impacts the design
of data management techniques, opening interesting research issues. Finally, “Is PicoDBMS the definite an-
swer to a sporadic problem or rather a first step towards a broader and longer term research?” is a legitimate
question putting database management on secured chip in perspective. If PicoDBMS has proved to be an ef-
fective answer to the initial problem statement (i.e., on-chip DBMS), it does not answer all the situations where
data management could benefit from secured chips. To illustrate this, chip manufacturers are announcing Mass
Storage Devices [7, 10, 13] combining a secured chip with a huge amount (several GB) of unsecured external
stable memory, dictating revisiting again the database technology on chip. The third contribution of the paper is
to devise new research perspectives considering extending the sphere of confidentiality of secure chips toward
external (unsecured) resources.
The paper is organized in three sections (Sections 2-4) addressing the three contributions mentioned above,
followed by a conclusion (Section 5).
2 PicoDBMS design and evaluation
Current powerful smart cards include in a monolithic chip, a 32 bit RISC processor clocked at about 50 MHz,
memory modules composed of about 96 KB of ROM, 4 KB of static RAM and 64 KB of EEPROM, and security
modules enforcing physical security. The ROM is used to store the operating system, fixed data and standard
routines. The RAM is used as working memory (heap and stack). EEPROM is used as stable memory to store
persistent information, and holds data and downloaded programs (in case of multi-application cards).
The smart card internal resource balance is very unique. Indeed, the on-board processing power, calibrated
to sustain cryptographic computations and enforce smart cards security properties, is oversized against the small
amount of embedded data. In addition, EEPROM shares strong commonality with RAM in terms of granularity
(direct access to any memory word) and read performance (60-100 ns/word), but suffers from a dramatically
slow write time (about 10 ms per word). Finally, only a few bytes of RAM remain available for the embedded
applications, the major part of the RAM being preempted by the operating system and the virtual machine (in
case of Java enabled cards).
As mentioned above, PicoDBMS must act as a trusted doorkeeper delivering to each authenticated user au-
thorized view of the data. A trivial solution would be to materialize each view in a separate file. However, this
badly adapts to data and access control policies evolutions and would result in a huge data replication among
files, thereby hurting the smart card limited storage constraint. Thus, a dynamic evaluation of the authorized
views must be considered, leading to embed on chip the ability to compute database operators and run query
execution plans implementing views. The database components that must be embedded are thus: a storage
manager to organize data and indices within the chip stable memory, an access right manager to enforce grants
and revokes on database views, a query manager to process execution plans and a transaction manager to en-
force the ACID properties. Other database functions (e.g., query parsing and result sorting) do not impact data
confidentiality and can be executed off card.
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To match the smart card aforementioned hardware constraints, we have defined a set of design rules for
on-chip database components [12]: Compactness rule (minimize data, index and code footprint), RAM rule
(minimize RAM consumption), Write rule (minimize writes to very slow EEPROM), Read rule (take advantage
of very fast reads in EEPROM), Access rule (take advantage of low granularity and direct reads in EEPROM),
CPU rule (take advantage of the over-dimensioned CPU) and Security rule (never externalize private data,
minimize code complexity). For the sake of conciseness, we recall below the storage, indexation and query
execution techniques compliant with those rules and summarize performance results from [3]. The complete
design of PicoDBMS is described in [12].
2.1 Storage and indexing models
The simplest way to organize data is Flat Storage (FS), where tuples are stored sequentially and attribute values
are embedded in tuples. The main advantage of FS is access locality. However, FS is space consuming (all
duplicate attribute values are stored) and inefficient (without index structures, FS relies on sequential scans for
all operations). Since locality is no longer an issue in our context (Read and Access rules), pointer-based storage
models may help combining indexing and compactness. The basic idea is to preclude any duplicate value to
occur. Values are grouped in domains (sets of unique values) and attribute values are replaced by pointers within
tuples (named tuple-to-value pointers). We call this model Domain Storage (DS). Obviously, attributes with no
duplicates (e.g., keys) are not stored using DS but with FS. While tuple update and deletion are more complex
than their FS counterpart, their implementation is more efficient in a smart card because the amount of data to
be written is smaller (Write rule).
Let us now consider index compactness. A select index is typically made of a collection of values and a
collection of pointers linking each value to all tuples sharing it (named value-to-tuple pointers). The collection
of values can be saved since it exactly corresponds to a domain extension. To get the collection of value-to-tuple
pointers almost for free, we store these pointers in place of the tuple-to-value pointers within the tuples. This
yields an index structure that makes a ring from the domain values to the tuples. The ring index can also be used
to access the domain values from the tuples and thus serves as data storage model. Thus we call Ring Storage
(RS) the storage of a domain-based attribute indexed by a ring. The index storage cost is reduced to its lowest
bound (one pointer per domain value), whatever the cardinality of the indexed relation, but slows down access
to tuples attributes (project operation) since retrieving the value for the attributes means traversing in average
half of the ring (i.e., up to reach the domain value).
Rel. R Rel. S Rel. R Rel. S
R.a S.b R.a S.b
PointersValues Pointers
Pointers
Values Right deep tree Extreme right deep tree
Select R1.A6, R2.A3
from R0, R1, R2
where R1.A0=R0.A1 and
R0.A2=R2.A0 and
R1.A4 value1  and
R2.A4 value2;
Materialization
Pipelining
R1 R0
R2
R1R0
R2
a. Domain Storage. b. Ring Storage.
Figure 1: Storage models for foreign keys. Figure 2: Extreme right deep tree example.
Join indices can be treated in a similar way. A join predicate of the form (R.a=S.b) assumes that R.a and
S.b vary on the same domain. Storing both R.a and S.b by means of rings leads to define a join index. As most
joins are performed on key attributes, R.a being a primary key and S.b being the foreign key referencing R.a,
key attributes are stored with FS in our model. Nevertheless, the extension of R.a precisely forms a domain,
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even if not stored outside of R, and attribute S.b varies on this domain. Thus, DS naturally implements for free
a unidirectional join index from S.b to R.a (Fig. 1a). Traversals from R.a to S.b can be optimized too by RS, a
bi-directional join index being obtained by a ring index on S.b (Fig. 1b).
2.2 Query processing
Devising a query execution engine compliant with the design rules introduced above is challenging. Indeed,
traditional query processing strives to exploit large main memory for storing temporary data structures (e.g.,
hash tables) and intermediate results and resorts to materialization on disk in case of memory overflow, which
hurts both Read and Write rules. To address this issue, we propose query processing techniques that do not use
any working RAM area (except for a small collection of cursors) nor incur any writes in stable memory.
Let us consider the execution of SPJ (Select-Project-Join) queries. PicoDBMS combines all operators in
an extreme right-deep tree execution plan, which leads to pure pipeline execution without materialization. Fig.
2 compares a classical plan with an extreme right deep tree on a SPJ query. As left operands are always base
relations, they are already materialized in stable memory. Pipeline execution can be easily achieved using the
well-known Iterator Model. A query execution plan is activated starting at the root of the operator tree. The
dataflow is demand-driven: a child operator passes a tuple onto its parent node in response to a next call from
the parent. The Select operator tests each incoming tuple against the selection predicate. Depending on the
storage model, attribute values are directly read in the tuple (FS) and/or reached by dereferencing a pointer (DS)
and/or by following a pointers ring (RS). With RS, the selection predicate (or part of it whether multi-attribute)
can be evaluated on the distinct values of a domain, and the matching tuples are directly retrieved following the
relevant pointers rings. The project operator is pushed up to the tree since no materialization occurs. Project
simply builds a result tuple by copying the value (FS) and/or dereferencing the cursors (DS) and/or following
the pointers ring (RS) to reach the value present in the input tuple. With FS, joins are implemented by nested
loops between the left and right inputs, since no other join technique can be applied without ad-hoc structures
(e.g., hash tables) and/or working area (e.g., sorting). In case of indices (DS/RS), the cost of joins depends on
the way indices are traversed. Consider the join between R (n tuples) and S (m tuples), S referencing R through
a foreign key. With DS, the join cost is proportional to m starting with S (i.e., right input is S) and to n × m
starting with R. With RS, the join cost becomes proportional to n + m starting with R and to m2/2n starting
with S (retrieving the R tuples associated to each S tuple incurs traversing half of a ring in average).
Let us finally consider the execution of the aggregate operator (sort is not described since it can be per-
formed off card). At first glance, pipeline execution is not compatible with aggregation, typically performed on
materialized intermediate results. Our solution exploits two properties: (i) aggregate can be done in pipeline if
the incoming tuples are yet grouped by distinct values and (ii) pipeline operators are order-preserving since they
consume (and produce) tuples in their arrival order. Thus, enforcing an adequate consumption order at the leaf
of the execution tree allows pipelined aggregation. If the grouping attribute is not part of the right leaf relation,
the execution tree has to be rearranged. Multi-attribute aggregation is trickier to implement since it imposes one
(resp. several) Cartesian product operator at the leaf of the tree in order to produce tuples ordered by a couple
(resp. tuple) of distinct grouping values.
2.3 PicoDBMS performance
Two different platforms, provided by our industrial partner Gemalto, have been used to measure PicoDBMS
performance: a real smart card prototype compliant with the aforementioned hardware characteristics and a
cycle-accurate hardware simulator of this prototype. The hardware simulator allows considering datasets ex-
ceeding the smart card storage capacity, up to 1MB. It delivers the exact number of CPU cycles between two
breakpoints set in the embedded code and thus provides exact performance predictions.
4
Several versions of PicoDBMS have been measured: P-FS (PicoDBMS-FS version) supports only the FS
storage model; P-DS is enhanced with the DS model for redundant attributes and foreign keys serving as a uni-
directional join index as shown in Fig. 1a; P-RS also supports the RS model both for selection and bidirectional
join indices. We evaluate the performance on a synthetic dataset composed of 5 joining tables, varying the num-
ber of embedded tuples (up to 50000 tuples), with simple (SP: select-project), regular (SPJ: select-project-join)
and complex queries (SPJG: select-project-join-aggregate). We refer the reader to [3] for further details on the
performance evaluation process and summarize below the main results regarding storage consumption, insertion
and query performance.
Stable storage consumption depends both on the database and the DBMS code footprint. While code foot-
print reduction has been exploited as a marketing advantage by lightweight DBMS vendors, our experience
shows that the challenge is more on reducing the database footprint than the code footprint. This is exemplified
by the small difference between the footprints of P-FS (26 KB) and P-RS (39 KB). The database footprint is
then the dominant factor except for very small datasets. As expected, P-FS is the least compact since it does not
benefit from any form of compression; P-DS is the most compact, domains acting as a dictionary compression
scheme (78% saving in our dataset); and the extra storage consumption incurred by P-RS is rather small (13%
worse than P-DS), highlighting the high compactness of ring indices.
Insertion throughput is acceptable whatever the DBMS version. Insert performance is essentially impacted
by the amount of writes in EEPROM. To this respect, P-DS performs better than P-RS itself performing better
than P-FS roughly in the proportions mentioned above for the database footprint. Note that the tuple creation
cost and the logging cost are independent of the relation size while integrity checking and domain update depend
on the relation and domain cardinality, respectively. This balance the cost of updating indexing structures with
the benefit provided to check integrity constraints.
Query execution performance, measured in throughput (result tuples produced per second), depends on the
query complexity and on the presence of indexing structures. Simple queries (SP) reach high throughput delivery
for any DBMS version (thousands of tuples/s). P-RS uses rings as selection indices, thus offering the highest
throughput for queries with high to medium selectivity but looses its advantage on P-FS and k for queries with
very low selectivity or no selection (projection overhead). Regular queries (SPJ) need P-DS or k to reach a
good performance (hundreds of tuples/s). Indeed, P-FS yields low throughput because joins are performed by
nested loops. With P-DS, the DS model implements a unidirectional join index imposing a unique join ordering
in the query execution plan (e.g., from R to S on Fig. 1a) and precluding applying some selections first. P-RS
takes advantage of the bidirectional join index provided by RS (see Fig. 1b), thus performing almost one order
of magnitude better than P-DS. Complex queries (SPJG) require P-RS to fairly support aggregation (tens to a
hundred of tuples/s). The important difference between SPJ and SPJG queries is explained by the high difficulty
to handle aggregations without consuming RAM. Thanks to rings, joins within aggregation queries are handled
with a limited degradation. The throughput remains stable when increasing the database size for aggregations
on a single attribute. For multi-attribute aggregations, the ring index can help for only one of them, the others
requiring Cartesian products, making the performance dependent on the database size.
The conclusion of this performance analysis is threefold. First, the performance results show without am-
biguity that the PicoDBMS design (more precisely P-RS) effectively accommodates real hardware platforms
thus answering positively the first question stated in the introduction. Second, the comparison between the
PicoDBMS versions provides hints to select the most appropriate storage and indexing model for a given ap-
plication. P-FS may suit very simple applications (small database, simple queries) if code simplicity is a main
requirement. Note however that this intuitive choice should be reconsidered if database footprint or insertion
cost is an important concern. P-DS sustains regular queries on large datasets, and P-RS fulfils the requirements
of more complex applications involving aggregate queries. Third, this study highlighted two fundamental dif-
ferences between traditional DBMS and on chip DBMS evaluation: (i) while performance is the usual metrics
for traditional DBMS, no single metrics dominates when evaluating on chip DBMS (e.g., performance, code
simplicity, storage consumption); (ii) the determination of on chip DBMS performance limits (e.g., maximal
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number of on-board tuples satisfying storage constraints or query performance requirements) is crucial and may
help fixing co-design hints, considering that the hardware platform is not adjustable after manufacturing. We are
currently working on a benchmark for on-chip DBMS taking these specificities into account.
3 Research Perspectives Driven by Hardware Properties
To answer the second question raised in the introduction, that is whether scaling down database techniques for
secure chips is still a topical issue, we analyze the main foreseeable hardware trends for secure chips an discuss
how they impact the design of embedded data management techniques.
3.1 Secure chips hardware trends
CPU resource: during the last ten years, embedded processors improved from the first 8-bit generation clocked
at 2 MHz to the current 32 bit generation clocked at 50 MHz with an added cryptographic coprocessor. At
least two factors advocate for a continuous growth of CPU power. First, the rapid evolution of secure chip
communication throughput (e.g., high delivery contactless cards, USB cards) allows secure chip applications
to evolve towards CPU intensive data flow processing using cryptographic capabilities (e.g., DRM). Second,
many efforts from secure chip manufacturers focus on multi-applications and multi-threaded operating systems
demanding even more CPU power. In addition, note that increasing the CPU power as little impact on the silicon
die size, an important parameter in terms of tamper-resistance and production cost on large scale markets.
RAM resource: secure chips hold today a few KB of static RAM, almost entirely consumed by the operating
system (and the Java virtual machine in Java enabled chips). The gap between the RAM left available to the
applications on one side and the CPU and stable storage resources on the other side will certainly keep on
increasing. First, manufacturers tend to reduce the hardware resources to their minimum to save production
costs. The relative cell size of static RAM (16 times less compact than ROM and FLASH, 4 times less compact
than EEPROM) makes it a critical component, which leads to calibrate the RAM to its minimum [2]. Second,
minimizing the die size increases the tamper-resistance of the chip, thus making physical attacks trickier and
more costly. RAM competing with stable memory on the same die, secure chip manufacturers favor the latter
against the former to increase the chip storage capacity, thus enlarging their application scope.
Stable storage resource: secure chips rely on a well established and slightly out-of-date hardware technology
(0.35 micron) to minimize production costs. However, the market pressure generated by emerging applications
leads to a rapid increase of the storage capacity. Taking advantage of a 0.18 micron technology allows doubling
the storage capacity of EEPROM memories. At the same time, manufacturers are integrating denser memory on
chip, like NOR and NAND FLASH. NOR FLASH is well suited for code due to its “execute-in-place” property
but its extremely high update cost makes it poorly adapted to data storage. NAND FLASH is a better candidate
for data storage though its usage is hard. Reads and writes are made at a page granularity and any rewrite must
be preceded by the erasure of a complete block (holding commonly 64 pages). In a long term perspective,
researchers in memory technologies aim at developing highly compact non-volatile memories providing fast
read/write operations with fine grain access (e.g., MEMS, PCM, etc.). But integrating these future technologies
in a secured chip introduces intrinsic difficulties: very high security level that needs to be proved for any new
technology, low manufacturing cost motivating the usage of old amortized technologies, complexity to integrate
all components in the same silicon die.
To conclude, PicoDBMS has been designed a couple of years ago to tackle the rather unusual computing
environment provided by secure chips. This environment was characterised by the three following properties:
(P1) High processing power wrt the amount of RAM and on-chip data; (P2) Tiny RAM wrt the amount of on-
chip data; (P3) Fast reads but slow writes in stable storage. As discussed above, these properties are expected
to remain stable in the future, at least until the integration of emerging memory technologies like MEMS and
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PCM. However, the diversification of hardware solutions (e.g., alternatives to EEPROM now exist) opens up
new perspectives to tackle the secure chip constraints.
3.2 Hardware driven research issues
Stable storage technology: FLASH memory is becoming an effective alternative for secured chips due to its com-
pactness, leading to new secure chip memory architectures mixing EEPROM, NAND and NOR FLASH. The
different memory properties should be taken into account when designing embedded database components and
specifically when designing the data storage and indexing models. [4] proposes techniques to store efficiently
data on a smart card equipped with NOR FLASH but is limited to mono relation queries. NAND FLASH advo-
cates for a sequential storage model (coarse grain erasure) while the reduced RAM of secured chips advocates
for a highly indexed storage model. Hybrid chip architectures (e.g., mixing EEPROM and NAND FLASH) may
lead to partition the data according to its update frequency/complexity (e.g., indices in EEPROM and data in
FLASH). A co-design study would be particularly helpful to determine the best balance between the different
types of memory. Long term memory alternatives could also be envisioned, including technologies like PCM,
OUM and Millipedes. There are already some works on Millipedes [16] in a classical database context. Combin-
ing the memory properties with the other hardware constraints will undoubtedly generate important problems.
RAM: RAM is a crucial resource for the evaluation of database queries. PicoDBMS has been designed to
cope with this issue (RAM rule), relying on an intensive use of indices. While this solution is convenient for
the targeted context, indices may be disqualified in update intensive contexts (e.g., sensed data) because they
increase update cost (especially in FLASH memory), they make update atomicity more complex to implement
and they competes with on-board data. In addition, throwing away indices may help reducing the database
footprint and the code complexity in contexts where performance is not the major concern. Thus, we consider
that designing RAM constrained query execution techniques will remain a hot topic in the future. In [2] we
proposed a first solution to minimize the RAM consumption in the query execution, assuming no index. First,
we designed a RAM lower bound query execution mode inducing several iterations on the data to compute the
query result. Second, we proposed a new form of optimization, called iteration filter, which drastically reduces
the cost incurred by the preceding model, without hurting this RAM lower bound. Finally, we analyzed how to
benefit from an incremental growth of the RAM amount. This work helps to determine: how much RAM should
be added to reach a given response time, how much the expected response time should be relaxed to tackle a
given query with a given quantity of RAM, how much data can be embedded in a given device without hurting
an expected execution time. This is a first step towards more complete co-design work aiming at calibrating all
resources of a hardware platform.
Cache conscious strategies: Another interesting research issue is improving the processor data cache usage
when processing queries. Indeed, some announced smart cards are now endowed with a cache holding up to 1
KB. Since query execution with a constrained RAM induces numerous iterations on the data (e.g., to perform
group by, joins without index), cache conscious algorithms could bring great performance improvements, di-
minishing the overheads of these iterations. Cache conscious strategies have been envisioned on traditional and
main-memory DBMS and led to reorganize indices storage and data layout [1]. The challenge is that cache con-
scious processing generally leads to rethink data and index storage organization in a way which may contradict
other concerns like data compactness and specific storage models dedicated to new stable memories. Co-design
could again be helpful to calibrate the processor cache and the RAM, both competing on the same silicon die.
Contactless interactions: Contactless interfaces are more and more promoted by constructors and govern-
mental organizations for their ease of use. While the current PicoDBMS design could adapt contactless smart
cards, whether the processing requirements (in terms of query types and execution time) remain the same is an
important question. For instance, severe response time constraints have to be enforced to avoid the card holder to
stop when passing near a contactless reader. A possible solution could be to reduce the completeness/accuracy
of the result for applications accepting partial results (e.g., top queries, approximate answers).
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4 Extending the Sphere of Confidentiality to External Resources
Secured chips are often plugged into or linked to more powerful devices (e.g., cell phone, PDA, PC, and even
servers). Thus, it does make sense to take advantage of the device resources to overcome the secured chip
limitations. The idea is to extend the sphere of confidentiality provided by the security properties of the chip to
external resources. This is actually the approach followed by the TPM [15] architecture where the secured chip
protects the whole PC platform. This section sketches how to extend the sphere of confidentiality to external
(unsecured) storage resources, to external processing resources and finally to a shared database server.
External Storage Resources: One of the main limiting factors of secure chips to address new domains of
applications is the tiny capacity of the stable memory. To tackle this issue, smart card manufacturers are pushing
new architectures combining in the same form factor (e.g., USB dongle) a smart-card-like secure microcontroller
with an Gigabyte sized external (then unsecured) FLASH memory module (e.g., Gemalto’s SUMO “smart card”,
Renesas X-Mobile Card [13]). To prevent from information disclosure and protect the integrity of the data stored
on the unsecured external memory, cryptographic techniques (e.g., encryption, secure hash functions, etc.) must
be employed. Some metadata (encryption keys, checksums, freshness information, bootstrap, etc.) and the
query evaluator itself must remain embedded in the secured chip to deliver only the authorized data to the user.
The problem is to combine cryptographic techniques and query execution techniques in a way satisfying three
conflicting objectives: efficiency, high security and compliance with the chip hardware resources.
External Processing Resources: External computing resources (e.g., the CPU and RAM of the terminal the
secure chip in connected with) could be exploited by delegating some expensive computation (e.g., sorting,
duplicate removal). However, this incurs two complex problems. First, the correctness of the delegated compu-
tation must be checked, and if some techniques exist for simple selections [8], no satisfactory solution has been
proposed so far for more complex operations. Second, delegating computation should not reveal any sensitive
information. Since some information can be inferred even from encrypted data, this remains a challenging issue.
External Shared Database: Up to now, we considered that data sharing is under the control of a single chip,
the external resources being considered as direct extensions of this chip. Assuming the database be stored on
a remote and unsecured server and be shared among different users, the spectrum of applications grows. For
instance, one may consider a shared database hosted by an — untrusted — Database Service Provider. The
Database Service Provider Model has been studied for the first time in [9], but sharing was not a concern in this
study. The sharing issue has been tackled in [5] thanks to an architecture called Chip-Secured Data Access (C-
SDA). C-SDA is a client-based security solution where a smart card acts as an incorruptible mediator between
a user and a remote encrypted database. The smart card checks the user’s privileges, participates in the query
evaluation and decrypts the final result before delivering it to the user. Since then, this hot topic generated
several papers including [6]. So far, existing studies focused only on the confidentiality of the remote data
but disregarded tamper-resistance (including opacity, integrity and freshness). Solutions relying on a secured
co-processor at the server side could also be investigated and would raise new research challenges.
5 Conclusion
Secure chips have severe hardware constraints which have triggered a deep revisiting of traditional database
techniques, with unusual design choices, leading to build a DBMS kernel called PicoDBMS. The objective
of this paper was to answer three important questions. The first question was related to the feasibility of the
PicoDBMS approach. We showed that the joint efforts from our team and from our industrial partner Gemalto
led to a convincing prototype which effectively accommodates real hardware platforms. The second question
was whether the problem addressed in the PicoDBMS study is still a topical issue despite the hardware progress.
We analyzed the secure chips hardware trends and showed that many important research issues still need be
explored. Finally, the third question was whether PicoDBMS opens up a broad and long term research. We
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showed that secured chip can be integrated in an insecure distributed computing system (e.g., a database system)
and be the ultimate trusted party the complete security relies on. We sketched some research perspectives in this
promising direction. Hence, we expect that this paper will contribute to the definition of an exciting research
agenda for database management on secure chip.
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